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ABSTRACT
As a Vice Chancellor, Chancellor, Chief Justice, and now a private
citizen, Leo Strine has consistently recognized the shape of power relations
within corporate law. With his wry wit and sharp prose, he has cut to the
quick on issues such as director independence, shareholder rights, and the
separation of ownership from ownership. Underlying these decisions are
both the recognition of the underlying power dynamics at play and the
pursuit of fairness under the law. As the Chief Justice has gone from
lawmaker to commentator, his perspective has shifted on the role of
corporate law in shaping society. Like him, we recognize that corporations
and corporate law have led our economy away from the middle-classoriented prosperity of the New Deal toward a bleaker landscape dominated
by corporate behemoths that leave working Americans behind. We argue
that corporate law must pivot to include workers under its aegis in order to
restore a fairer working environment, economy, and polity. Chief Justice
Strine is well positioned to take us in that new direction.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate law is about power. It dictates who controls the legal entity
that houses most American businesses, and thereby who can use its property,
what goods or services it sells, who works for the company, and who can
take its profits. Delaware has always seemed to be something of an odd
match with corporate law; one of the smallest states, it sits snug between
New Jersey and Maryland, almost hiding up the banks of the Delaware River.
And yet when business titans clash, their disputes often end up in the
courtrooms of the First State. 1
Over his twenty-one years on the Delaware bench, former Vice
Chancellor, Chancellor, and Chief Justice Leo Strine became perhaps the
most influential and beloved corporate law jurist in the country. Along with
his incisive judicial opinions, Strine has regularly published thoughtful and
pointed commentary on corporate law and policy. Far from daunted by the
stakes of the matters before his court, Strine brought a sharp wit and a keen
eye to the proceedings, focusing on the need for fair play. Moving beyond
the courtroom, he has expanded his field of play considerably. But he brings
the same concerns about justice, fairness, and the fate of the less powerful.
In this essay, we explore Strine’s jurisprudence and commentary from
this perspective of power and equity. As a jurist, constrained by the law and
more optimistic about the underlying endeavor, Strine understood and
acknowledged the unparalleled role of shareholders within the Delaware
corporate law framework. But as he has watched the rapacious appetite of
corporate entities render the rest of society overmatched, his views have
shifted about the ultimate role of corporate law within the economy. This
shift parallels a new perspective in the broader culture about the importance
of worker participation in actual governance of the corporation. Having been
left behind for too long, workers want a new approach. Corporate law is
ready to pivot, we argue, and Strine is ideally positioned to lead us toward a
new set of power structures.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER RELATIONS AND FAIR PLAY
Delaware courts live in rarefied air: they handle raucous and unwieldy
1. One striking illustration of the power of the Delaware Chancery: then-Disney CEO
and Chairman Michael Eisner sitting in Chancellor Chandler’s courtroom in Georgetown,
Delaware, which has a population of approximately eight thousand people. World Population
Review, Georgetown, Delaware Population 2022, https://worldpopulationreview.com/uscities/georgetown-de-population [https://perma.cc/ASN2-MNVC] (last visited February 22,
2022). For a discussion of the courtroom drama, see JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEYWAR (2006).
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disputes among the biggest corporations on the planet. As a member of the
Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court, Strine used his humor and sharp
insights to poke through the grandiosity of corporate law and unearth the
human realities within. And while those looking for evidence of employee,
environmental, social, and governance (EESG) and worker empowerment in
his role as a jurist will find sympathetic statements, Strine firmly believed in
following the law, and Delaware law clearly embodies the principles of
shareholder primacy. 2 Within these confines, Strine took on the role of
honest broker: a fair-minded and savvy umpire looking out for the rules
while understanding the importance of context.
Strine’s opinions demonstrate a concern for power imbalances and for
the fairness of the process. His decision in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litigation is reflective of this approach. 3 In response to a derivative suit
against Oracle for alleged insider trading by three Oracle directors, the
company set up a special litigation committee to review the litigation. When
the committee passed on taking it up, plaintiffs alleged that the group was
not sufficiently independent to judge the matter impartially. Despite
recognizing the committee’s lengthy report and diligence bona fides, the
Vice Chancellor found reasonable doubt as to the committee’s impartiality.
Two of the members of the committee were faculty members at Stanford
University, leading to potential conflicts with the alleged wrongdoers—one
was a Stanford professor, and the other two were significant donors to the
university. 4 The axes of relations between the five were cross-cutting,
complex, and fraught with potential for bias. 5 Although the traditional
Delaware standard on lack of independence looked more towards
dependence—notions of domination and control—Vice Chancellor Strine
chose a more nuanced view of the concept. He wrote: “Delaware law should
not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that simplifies human
motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law and
economics movement.” 6 Noting that directors are generally “deeply
enmeshed in social institutions,” he did not impugn their good faith; rather,
he found that “persons of integrity and reputation can be compromised in
2. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 25–26, 48 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(holding that defendant directors, controlling stockholders of Craiglsist, Inc., breached their
fiduciary duties to eBay, a minority shareholder of the company).
3. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
4. Id. at 920–21.
5. It did not help the sense of fair play that many of these connections did not come to
light until discovery. Id. at 929 (“In view of the modesty of these disclosed ties, it was with
some shock that a series of other ties among Stanford, Oracle, and the Trading Defendants
emerged during discovery.”).
6. Id. at 938.
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their ability to act without bias when they must make a decision adverse to
others with whom they share material affiliations.” 7 By looking beyond the
formalities to understand the colorful palette of human relations, Vice
Chancellor Strine provided a much more realistic and power-centered
perspective on the independence requirement.
In dealing with litigation surrounding mergers and acquisitions
(M&A)—a critical aspect of Delaware’s domain—Strine looked to
determine the nature of the deal that had been struck and to hold the parties
to their bargain. His decision in the IBP-Tyson merger reflected his
understanding that Tyson had intentionally ignored warning signs before the
deal was consummated but then tried to act on its post-merger regrets. 8
These combatants knew what they were getting into, and that people could
get hurt. In assessing the process that led to the agreement, Vice Chancellor
Strine wrote:
The negotiations between IBP and Tyson did not take place
between a world-wise, globe-trotting capitalist with an army of
advisors on one side, and Jethro Bodine, on the other. Instead, two
equally sophisticated parties dealt with each other at arms’ length
with the aid of expensive and highly skilled advisors. 9
And in finding that specific performance of the merger was appropriate,
despite the acrimony between the two sides, the Vice Chancellor stated:
Tyson will have the power to decide all the key management
questions itself. . . . While this may be unpleasant for the top level
IBP managers who might be replaced, it was a possible risk of the
Merger from the get-go and a reality of today’s M & A market. 10
This view of M&A reality reflects Strine’s bifurcated approach while
on the bench: corporate armies fought against themselves in one world, while
civilians needed protection in the other. Boardroom battles were conducted
between directors, executives, corporate raiders, hedge fund and pension
fund managers, controlling stockholders, and their coterie of lawyers and
bankers—scenes replayed in books like Barbarians at the Gate 11 and
DisneyWar. 12 The civilians on the outside—average, hard-working people
who made the cars, swept up the Disneyland streets, and went about their
business with honor and decency—were not really part of the internecine
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 938, 947.
In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 23 (Del. Ch. 2001).
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 83–84.
BRYAN BURROUGHS, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990).
STEWART, supra note 1.
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struggles. To the extent they were threatened with collateral damage, Strine
looked to shield them.
On April 5, 2010, twenty-nine coal miners died at the Upper Branch
Mine in Raleigh, West Virginia, after a series of explosions within the mine;
safety authorities later determined that the mine had been managed in a
“profoundly reckless manner.” 13 Massey Energy Company owned the mine,
and its president Don Blakenship was subsequently convicted of criminal
charges for the incident. 14 Soon thereafter, the company sought to merge
with Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., but Massey shareholders filed suit to
enjoin the merger in order to proceed directly on their derivative claims
against Massey management. Contraposed to those executives, the
shareholders had a sympathetic narrative—seeking justice against the
wrongdoers.
Vice Chancellor Strine, however, had his eye on something other than
these corporate matters in the midst of tragedy:
Amidst public concern about the human loss at Upper Big Branch,
the stock market focused on what it does, thereby allowing profit
seekers to buy and sell Massey stock based on their differing views
about what this terrible event, and Massey’s mode of operating,
portended for the company’s ability to generate future cash
flows. 15
He denied the shareholders’ requested injunction, ultimately leaving the
merger’s fate to a shareholder vote. 16 Recognizing that Massey leadership’s
flagrant disregard for safety regulations was likely a Caremark violation, 17
the Vice Chancellor nevertheless reflected on the ultimate victims of the
mine’s disaster:
The purpose of the mine safety laws is not to protect Massey and
its stockholders, it is to protect miners. The purpose of the
environmental laws is not to protect Massey and its stockholders,
it is to protect the environment. Against what are these laws
directed? The answer is obvious: the incentive for entities to

13. April 5, 2010: Explosions Rock the Upper Big Branch Mine, W. VA. PUB. RADIO
(April 5, 2021, 7:19 AM), https://www.wvpublic.org/radio/2017-04-05/april-5-2010explosions-rock-the-upper-big-branch-mine [https://perma.cc/9P6G-SFH3].
14. Id.
15. In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430, 2011 WL 2176479, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2011).
16. Id. at *4 (“If Massey stockholders believe that the company can do better by
remaining independent, they have the uncoerced, informed chance to make that decision for
themselves.”).
17. Id. at *21.
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generate externalities in their pursuit of profits. 18
Looking at them purely from the limited vantage of the corporate
governance morality play, shareholders here were victims of the same
managerial predations as workers. From a wider perspective, however,
shareholders were part of the corporate governance that had resulted in the
accidents. Strine did not countenance management’s alleged law-breaking,
nor did he view it as an instantiation of shareholder wealth maximization.19
But neither did he see the shareholders as powerless players left to uncertain
fate. As he noted ruefully, looking to broader notions of complicity:
“Subterranean mining will never be a risk-free or entirely clean business.
That is a reality and every self-aware adult in this intensely energyconsuming society has coal on his conscience.” 20
In his oversight of corporate gamesmanship, Strine had a keen eye for
the rogues and ne’er-do-wells, and was not afraid to call them out for their
malfeasance. 21 He was skeptical of transactions undertaken by controlling
shareholders, understanding the underlying power dynamics and looking out
for the disempowered minority holders. 22 He was not afraid to call out
Delaware’s existing jurisprudence for its failings. 23 He was a maverick, but
18. Id. at *23.
19. Vice Chancellor Strine noted: “Despite the straw man arguments of certain
academics, Delaware law does not charter law breakers. Delaware law allows corporations
to pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory floor, which is the
requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue ‘lawful business’ by ‘lawful acts.’ As a
result, a fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by
knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.” Id. at *20.
20. Id. at *23.
21. See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1030 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding
that controlling shareholder Conrad Black “breached his fiduciary and contractual duties
persistently and seriously”).
22. See, e.g., In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 764
(Del. Ch. 2011) (“A focused, aggressive controller extracted a deal that was far better than
market, and got real, market-tested value of over $3 billion for something that no member of
the special committee, none of its advisors, and no trial expert was willing to say was worth
that amount of actual cash.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate
Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678
(2005) (noting the “obvious fear that even putatively independent directors may owe or feel
a more-than-wholesome allegiance to the interests of the controller, rather than to the
corporation and its [minority] stockholders”); see also Richard B. Schmitt, Delaware
Defender Leo Strine Is Fighting to Uphold the State’s Reputation As the Venue for Corporate
America to Get A Fair Shake, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2012, at 52, 55 (“Strine has been highly
suspicious of transactions initiated by controlling shareholders.”).
23. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 643 (Del. Ch.
2005) (“Even more, by creating a standard of review that makes it impossible for a controlling
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one who was cognizant of the ultimate structure of the game being played
and the boundaries within which he needed to operate. 24
As his tenure on Delaware courts proceeded, however, Strine did seem
to develop a more jaundiced view of the machinations of institutional
shareholders and their advocates. This edge was accompanied by a growing
interest in corporate law “civilians”—those normal folks who were largely
ignorant about how intrigues at the highest levels affected their retirement
savings, their consumer options, their jobs. The disconnect between the
corporate governance “game” and the economic ramifications of that game
seemed more disturbing. As he noted in a recent article:
In the back and forth about short-term effects on stock price,
Tobin’s Q, survivorship bias, and the like, the flesh-and-blood
human beings our corporate governance system is supposed to
serve get lost. But, unless we consider the economic realities of
these ordinary human investors and how those realities bear on
what is best for them, we are not focused on what is most important
in assessing the public policies shaping our corporate governance
system. 25
This theme had emerged earlier, primarily in his academic work. He
bemoaned that average Americans were drawn into these corporate power
plays seeming against their will, calling them “forced capitalists.” 26 Perhaps
Strine’s most prominent idée fixe has been the ongoing “separation of
ownership from ownership” as manifested in the growing power and
prominence of investing intermediaries. 27 Eyeing the potential for diverging
incentives between these institutional investors and their ultimate
stockholder to structure a going private merger in any fashion that will enable a successful
attack on a complaint that alleges financial unfairness on a notice pleading basis, [Kahn v.
Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.] has generated perverse incentives for both defense and
plaintiffs’ counsel that cast doubt on the integrity of the representative litigation process.”).
24. Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward A True Corporate Republic: A
Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1759, 1759 (2006) (stating that “[a]s a judge who decides corporate law cases,” his
expressed views would be “necessarily constrained”).
25. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L.J. 1870, 1871 (2017).
26. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in A More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007) (“As a result of these changing dynamics, most
ordinary Americans have little choice but to invest in the market. They are in essence ‘forced
capitalists,’ even though they continue to depend for their economic security on their ability
to sell their labor and to have access to quality jobs.”).
27. Id. at 6–7.
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beneficiaries, Strine believes them to be behind much of the governance
mischief of our age. 28 The consequence? Rapid shareholder turnover with
a short-term focus, disengagement from the beneficial owners, rocketing
compensation for executives and the lawyers and bankers who work with
them, and corporate abandonment of workers and communities. 29 The
compact between Big Business and the rest of society had been shattered,
with grievous results. 30
In surveying the damage that corporate-law civilians have suffered,
Strine has had less patience with the aggrieved cries of institutional
shareholders. 31 Perhaps that explains his sometimes puzzling indifference to
seemingly legitimate shareholder concerns about managerial overreach. 32
After all, given their power with the corporation, they shouldn’t have much
to complain about. 33 Over time, his frank acknowledgements of shareholder
power—“only capital has the right to vote!” 34—have curdled into something
28. Strine, supra note 24, at 1765–66 (“The traditionalist has no illusions that the interests
of mutual fund managers are identical to those of their shareholders, most of whom are not
invested in pursuit of short-term quick hits but to build wealth to send children to college or
sustain themselves after retirement—the sort of wealth that comes only from a diverse
portfolio, containing corporations that deliver profits by producing useful products and
services.”).
29. Strine, supra note 25, at 1871–72; see Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, The
Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561, 562
(2015) (describing how corporate executives “have used short-term gimmicks to get shortterm stock price gains that will increase their own compensation, while making the
corporation and its shareholders no better off”).
30. Ira M. Millstein, Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Eric Talley, Looking Back with A Legend: Ira
Millstein Reflects on the Impact of Milton Friedman’s Views on Corporate Governance, 76
BUS. LAW. 945, 947 (2021).
31. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
451 (2014) (“Bebchuk is the sincere champion of one group of ‘agents’ wielding power and
authority over others’ money—the money managers who control most of the investments
belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who are saving to pay for their retirements and
for their children’s education—against another group of ‘agents’ that he believes is somehow
more conflicted—the agents who actually manage corporations that make real products and
deliver useful services (i.e. ‘productive corporations’).”).
32. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939
(Del. Ch. 2013) (permitting the board to adopt forum-selection bylaws on a contractual theory,
despite an absence of shareholder approval).
33. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for
Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165,
1177 (2017) (“The boards of these corporations believed that the republic they were governing
owed its loyalty to its only citizens, and those citizens are called stockholders.”).
34. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders
in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169,
1187 (2002).
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more soured on the enterprise.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PRIMACY
Shareholder primacy has been the consensus governance model in
corporate law for decades, 35 and the right of shareholders to elect the board
of directors has been around even longer. 36 The theoretical foundation for
this arrangement, though, did not achieve full flower until the law and
economics movement in corporate law at the end of the last century. One
prominent model describes the corporation as a nexus of freely bargained
contracts among all corporate constituents, and therefore presumptively the
most efficient way to structure firm governance.37 Another model focuses
on shareholders in their roles as owners of the corporate residual, which in
theory gives them the appropriate incentives to make good firm decisions. 38
Rights to the residual also provide shareholders with a common interest in
maximizing corporate profits, which arguably reduces their tendency to
squabble about firm decisions and thus promotes efficiency.
In their foundational work on the law and economics of corporate law,
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel married these two models into a
simple, intertwined structure. Their book, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law, 39 reaffirmed the shareholder primacy norm by arguing that
shareholders were the most economically vulnerable of the firm’s
participants.
This vulnerability, coupled with their homogeneous
preferences for wealth maximization, meant that shareholders should be
35. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (“[D]irectors are
charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act
in the best interests of its shareholders.”); see also E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation
Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices—or Vice Versa?, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184 (2001) (stating that Delaware law adopts the norm of shareholder
primacy).
36. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1351–53 (2006) (noting
that shareholders have had voting power extending back to the earliest of corporations).
37. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the socalled nexus of contracts theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a complex set of explicit
and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal
arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large
economy.”).
38. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395 (1983).
39. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
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accorded the basic governance rights of the corporation. 40 This
homogeneous interest in profits also eliminated the possibility of destructive
voting cycles, à la Arrow’s theorem. 41 Easterbrook and Fischel contended
that the other participants in the corporation agreed, through their own
contracts, to provide shareholders with residual rights to the corporation’s
profits and the voting rights that come with them. 42 Thus, the shareholder
primacy norm provided the overriding purpose to the corporate form, while
the nexus of contracts theory demonstrated how the parties reached this
arrangement through something akin to voluntary agreements. These
arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise, many of which are now
more than four decades old, continue to be cited, recited, and relied upon by
the universe of scholars of corporate governance.
We and others have questioned these traditional arguments for the
shareholder franchise. The nexus of contracts model of the corporation is an
entirely fictitious account of the corporation and its constituents, and tells us
very little about the choices that actual shareholders and other corporate
constituents would make in the absence of various constraints. 43 The
argument based on the residual is undercut by the growing realization that
shareholders do not have a common interest in wealth maximization, but
instead have interests that diverge along a number of dimensions. 44 As a
result, scholars are losing trust in shareholders with significant power, 45 and
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 17, 37.
See GRANT M. HAYDEN & MATTHEW T. BODIE, RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION:
FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO SHARED GOVERNANCE 50–67 (2020) (putting forward
alternate descriptive and normative theories of the corporate form); Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic Politics of Corporation as Contract,
53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2018) (critiquing the nexus of contracts theory and shareholder
voting).
44. HAYDEN & BODIE, supra note 43, at 68–102; see Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire,
Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
767, 791 (2017) (describing “several sources of conflict among shareholders, including
differing investment horizons and needs for cash payouts, empty voting, and competing
outside interests”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the
False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 477–98 (2008)
(detailing divergent shareholder interests); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About
Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 574–92 (2006) (describing rent
seeking and other features that conflict with the shareholder primacy account of shareholder
voting).
45. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (“[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence not to
improve overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit at other
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there is even support for nonvoting shares and passive shareholding.46 Those
who support strengthened shareholder power are accused of supporting
special interests and shadow agendas. 47 And the argument based on Arrow’s
theorem, with its prediction of firm-destroying voting cycles, was
nonsensical from the very beginning. 48 Thus, the intellectual foundations of
shareholder primacy have been subject to a sustained critique, mostly from
the inside.
This has left us in a curious position. The intellectual foundations of
shareholder primacy—particularly those espoused by Easterbrook and
Fischel—are on shaky ground. And there has been little attempt to shore
them up by rehabilitating the original arguments or developing new ones. At
the same time, the “corporate governance machine” 49 lumbers on, oblivious
to the collapse of the very ideas that helped set it in motion.
It is at this moment, though, that Strine’s recent scholarly contributions
are the most valuable. First, along with Aneil Kovvali, he identifies some
compelling empirical reasons for doubting Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory
of the corporation. 50 Second, he gives a straightforward explanation for the
continued dominance of shareholder primacy despite the collapse of its
theoretical justifications: the exercise of corporate political power.51 And
Strine makes both contributions with the authority of one who has spent a
shareholders’ expense.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (“[S]hareholder voting is properly
understood not as a primary component of the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather
as an accountability device of last resort, to be used sparingly, at most.”).
46. Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 687, 697–98 (2019); see Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder
Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 497 (2018) (arguing that passive funds should not have voting
rights).
47. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk’s
argument for shareholder empowerment would help “precisely the institutions most likely to
use their position to self-deal—that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm’s assets and
earnings—or otherwise to reap private benefits not shared with other investors”); Strine, supra
note 31, at 451.
48. HAYDEN & BODIE, supra note 43, at 103–21; see also Grant Hayden & Matthew
Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219
(2009) (arguing that cyclical outcomes are unlikely).
49. Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 2563 (2021).
50. See Aneil Kovvali & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Win-Win That Wasn’t: Managing to the
Stock Market’s Negative Effects on American Workers and Other Corporate Stakeholders (U.
Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 940, 2022) (outlining data that
suggests that shareholder primacy has not redounded to the benefit of workers).
51. Id. at 3–5, 25–32; Dorothy S. Lund & Leo E. Strine, Corporate Political Spending is
Bad Business, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2022), https://hbr.org/2022/01/corporate-politicalspending-is-bad-business [https://perma.cc/K8W3-VJ7C].
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career in the “real world” of corporate law.
Strine points to several situations where the theory of shareholder
primacy founders on the shoals of the modern corporate world. The theory,
for example, describes a corporation devoted to the interests of shareholders
as a “win-win” situation for other corporate constituents (and, more broadly,
society). 52 This is the familiar argument from the residual, where
shareholders are free to maximize returns to the corporation while those
spoils are divvied up among other constituents by contract and regulation. 53
Unfortunately, this isn’t quite how things have unfolded. Instead,
corporations have generated enormous wealth for shareholders, but largely
at the expense of other constituents, especially workers. 54 Studies document
that much of the rise in returns to equity is not the result of genuine economic
growth, but a result of a reallocation of the rewards from other
stakeholders—especially workers—to shareholders. 55 The decline in
unionization and reduction in worker protections has left labor in a position
where they are able to capture a diminishing share of the returns; more winlose than win-win. The prediction that shareholder primacy would produce
a tide that lifts all boats has not materialized.
This leads Strine to examine what went wrong. The culprits, it turns
out, are a series of flawed assumptions. For example, institutional investors
with more narrow, short-term interest control most of the corporate voting
these days. 56 More important, the argument for the residual depends on labor
power or government regulation to force firms to internalize the costs of their
behavior. These protections, though, have declined dramatically. Labor
protections, antitrust law, environmental protections, and the like continue
to break down, allowing shareholders to allocate more of the gains to
themselves. 57 The win-win scenario assumes the continued presence of these
52. See Kovvali & Strine, supra note 50, at 7–10 (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 39).
53. See id. (explicating Easterbrook and Fischel’s version of the argument from the
residual); see also HAYDEN & BODIE, supra note 43, at 88–102 (explaining and critiquing the
argument from the residual).
54. See Kovvali & Strine, supra note 50, at 10–14 (discussing studies that show increased
shareholder returns have come at the expense of other constituencies).
55. See id. (citing, among other sources, Daniel L. Greenwald, Martin Lettau & Sydney
C. Ludvigson, How the Wealth Was Won: Factors Shares as Market Fundamentals (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25769, rev. Apr. 2021), https://www.nber.org
/system/files/working_papers/w25769/w25769.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPN8-86WS]; Anna
Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An
Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, Spring 2020, at 63).
56. See id. at 15–23 (discussing the power of institutional investors).
57. See id. at 23–39 (detailing the decline in protections for other corporate stakeholders).
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protections to make the move from exclusive shareholder control to a shared
prosperity. “Easterbrook and Fischel,” however, “assumed all of the
important problems away.” 58 These unwarranted assumptions explain the
predictive failure of their project.
Strine’s other contribution is to help explain the reasons behind the
continuing dominance of shareholder primacy. And dominate it does:
despite recent lip service to other stakeholders in the form of debates about
corporate purpose, there is no serious move to tinker with the underlying
governance structures of corporations. How does such a system survive with
its theoretical underpinnings in tatters? The answer, according to Strine, is
straightforward: corporations have deployed their political power in a way
to diminish external protections for other stakeholders and free corporations
to pursue profits on behalf of their shareholders. 59
This explanation is undoubtedly true. But it nonetheless bears emphasis
as an important part of the story. The existing system is not going to fall
apart simply because the original justifications turned out to be faulty. Nor
is it going to self-correct. Once corporate power is exercised in the political
arena—and we’ve seen this occur across the board, as legislatures, agencies,
and courts become more responsive to corporate concerns—it’s going to be
very difficult to develop a political solution to the problem.
Strine and his coauthors, then, have identified and exposed some of the
key shortcomings of shareholder primacy theory. They have, in the words
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, done the work of dragging the dragon “out of his
cave on to the plain and in the daylight, [so] you can count his teeth and
claws, and see just what is his strength.” 60 But it’s important to remember
that, for Holmes, this was only the first step. “The next is either to kill him,
or to tame him and make him a useful animal.” 61

58. Id. at 4.
59. See id. at 3–5 (noting that corporate use of political power eroded protections for
stakeholders); id. at 25–32 (describing corporations’ effective use of political power); see also
Lund & Strine, supra note 51 (discussing the effect of Citizens United on corporate political
spending and the contrast between corporations’ public statements versus their political
donations); Leo E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension
Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335,
335–43 (2015) (identifying a tension between the conservative justices’ Citizens United
decision and conservative corporate theory).
60. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
61. Id.
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III. A PIVOT TO PARTICIPATION
A. External Reforms are Insufficient
We might have had a chance at a world where corporate warriors could
battle within the Chancery’s care and the rest of the world would not suffer
repercussions. This is the post-New Deal world, where for a time jobs for
working-class (white) Americans were more plentiful, unions bargained for
strong wages and benefits, and business executives waved hello to line
workers from their neighboring driveways. 62 Maybe this world never really
existed, at least in its idealized form, but unionization rates did reach onethird of private sector workers in the 1950s, and in the 1970s CEO pay was
only thirty times the average worker’s pay, rather than 350 times. 63
Something seems dangerously broken about our current levels of economic
inequality, our indifference to the looming climate catastrophe, and our
political polarization and intolerance for each other’s perspectives. We need
to reassess where we have been for the last half-century—particularly the
last twenty years. 64
So, what to do? In the early to mid-twentieth century, unions organized
employees across the country by economic force. 65 In industries such as auto
manufacturing, truck driving, and steel production, they held together and
went on strike to improve their wages and benefits. There is strong evidence
that unions were the key to the post-War economic boom and the rising
62. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Development on a Cracked Foundation: How the Incomplete
Nature of New Deal Labor Reform Presaged Its Ultimate Decline, A Response to Cuéllar,
Levi, and Weingast, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 79 (2020) (“For many white Americans, the
post-War era is one of a confident America, proceeding from its victory over evil forces to a
prosperous time of greater inclusiveness.”).
63. Abigail Johnson Hess, In 2020, Top CEOs Earned 351 Times More than the Typical
Worker, CNBC, (Sept. 15, 2021, 1:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/15/in-2020-topceos-earned-351-times-more-than-the-typical-worker.html
[https://perma.cc/U6VW-YXJ
M].
64. Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in
Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 BUS.
LAW. 397, 399 (2021) (“For at least forty years, a strain of economic thinking, typically
embraced by those who believe that society is best served when corporations focus solely on
making profits for stockholders, has increased the power of economic elites and gone to war
against the regulatory state and externality protections put in place by the New Deal and Great
Society to protect workers, consumers, the environment, and society generally.”).
65. See Nicholas Kristof, The Cost of a Decline in Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/nicholas-kristof-the-cost-of-a-decline-inunions.html [https://perma.cc/L44B-6BCX] (describing how unions have been integral to
maintaining the middle class and suggesting that the decline in unions has led to income
inequality).

2022]

POWER, PRIMACY, AND THE CORPORATE LAW PIVOT

899

fortunes of the middle class. 66 However, these representatives of collective
worker power have been significantly diminished. The percentage of
unionized private-sector employees has been steadily shrinking since its
1950s peak of about 35% to the current 6.1%. 67 As labor law scholars have
chronicled, this withering of union power has many potential causes:
sustained campaigns of employer hostility, weakened legal protections for
workers and unions in a variety of contexts, competition from globalization
and automation, and changing expectations about collective action and
solidarity. 68 To this point, the nation has failed to undertake serious efforts
to revive its fortunes.
Labor law needs reform. 69 But there are also structural problems with
labor law as the primary driver of economic change. The NLRA creates
zones of power and influence that leave the underlying business
organizational structure intact. Employers are only required to bargain on
specific topics that could be considered “mandatory” subjects of
bargaining; 70 they have no duty to negotiate over issues such as product
development, financing, leadership composition, executive compensation,
and internal firm governance. 71 Employers may be forced to talk with the
employees’ representatives about the employees’ bargain with the firm, but

66. See JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1–2 (2014) (describing how
unions were “the core equalizing institution” for income equality).
67. Economic News Release: Union Members Summary, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan.
20, 2022, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc
/J47H-4KW3]; see also TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING
INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 128 (2012) (discussing the decline in
union membership).
68. See, e.g., ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE
ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS (1st ed. 2006) (documenting the decline of union power and
making proposals for how to revive it); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE
FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990) (same but proposing reforms that go beyond
revamping union power); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2002) (noting the gap between workers’ desire for union
representation and the actual supply of such representation); Michael H. Gottesman, Wither
Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2769 (1991)
(stating that private sector unionization has decreased nearly 30% from its peak).
69. For examples of proposals for reform, see JULIUS GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER
OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT (2010); SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN SACHS, CLEAN
SLATE FOR WORKER POWER: BUILDING A JUST ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY,
https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/full_report_clean_slate_for_worker_power.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AW38-XL5Z].
70. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing
the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).
71. See id. (emphasizing a party’s freedom to bargain or not bargain over other subjects).
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they have no duty to talk about how it runs the business. 72 Labor law doesn’t
provide employees and their representatives with participation in managerial
decision-making. 73
Moreover, the exclusion of labor from corporate governance means that
the power of the corporate form will continue to be exerted against efforts to
bolster workers. As our honoree at this symposium has recognized, the flow
of funds from corporate coffers has flooded our political system, wiping out
other participants in the process. 74 Although unions have significant
political power in the United States, ultimately their donations are dwarfed
by Wall Street contributions. Corporate leaders and financiers provide
significantly more money to political campaigns than do unions. 75 A
relatively small number of families provide a big chunk of overall political
spending. 76 As a result, corporate spending reflects the interests of those
who run the corporations and exercise absolute or effective control over
them. Their interests do not align with those of ordinary workers. 77
It is worth remembering that the New Deal was not the product of a
harmonious partnership between capital and labor; established business
interests fought tooth and nail against the reforms. 78 It took a terrible
depression, a failed status quo presidency, and a visionary reformer with
72. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (explaining how
every decision made that may affect job security does not trigger mandatory bargaining).
73. Cf. Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at the
Crossroads, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 181, 186–87 (1987) (discussing criticisms of the NLRA and
the NLRB as weak and ineffectual).
74. Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019
WIS. L. REV. 451, 452 (2019); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of
Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for
Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH. U.L. REV. 1007, 1033 (2020).
75. Dave Jamieson & Paul Blumenthal, Labor Unions Spent a Record Amount on the
Elections. But Not as Much as These 5 People, HUFF. POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:52 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/labor-union-election2016_us_58223b92e4b0e80b02cd7259 [https://perma.cc/D6L9-RD9K].
76. Nicholas Confessore, Sarah Cohen & Karen Yourish, The Families Funding the 2016
Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015
/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-election-super-pac-donors.html [https://perma.cc/FB8GBGVP] (“These donors’ fortunes reflect the shifting composition of the country’s economic
elite. . . . Most built their own businesses, parlaying talent and an appetite for risk into huge
wealth: They founded hedge funds in New York, bought up undervalued oil leases in Texas,
made blockbusters in Hollywood.”).
77. Strine, supra note 74, at 1033 (“For diversified investors, any increased profitability
by particular corporations that results from externalities is suffered by them both as Worker
Investors and as human citizens who pay taxes, breathe air, and have values not synonymous
with lucre.”).
78. KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE
NEW DEAL (W.W. Norton & Co. 2010).
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huge Congressional majorities to enact the suite of regulatory protections
that created the modern American administrative state. Because those
reforms left the basic corporate governance structure in place, the internal
relationship between corporate management and workers remained unfairly
balanced against labor. If we want a stable new equilibrium that empowers
ordinary working folks, we need a new power structure to sustain it.
B. Why Workers (and Other Stakeholders) Need Governance Rights
In its current incarnation, “stakeholderism” is a fairly anemic concept.
In the debates about corporate purpose, it appears as the foil to shareholder
primacy. In fact, however, many proponents of stakeholder theory take the
underlying system of shareholder governance for granted—the debate is over
whether the shareholder-elected board (and the officers they employ) should
pay any attention to constituents other than those who elect them. 79 And this
version of stakeholderism is duly criticized as being bad for shareholders and
perhaps even counterproductive for the very stakeholders it seeks to
empower. 80 All the while, the possibility of giving other stakeholders real
governance rights is scarcely mentioned. 81
Strine’s vision of the corporation is largely in line with this conception
of stakeholderism. He recognizes the flaws in shareholder primacy and
argues for a series of changes to corporate law (and other regulatory regimes)
to address them. 82 He advocates for a move toward the public benefit
corporation model, where the firm has a duty to all stakeholders and to avoid
causing harm to society 83 (but, notably, does not give other stakeholders

79. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 67–
184 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson, eds., 2021) (essays debating the board’s duty
to consider the interests of stakeholders).
80. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 92 (2020) (claiming that stakeholderism should not be
expected to provide extra protection to stakeholders and in fact may hurt them by reducing
the size of the overall economy).
81. See id. at 161–63 (briefly considering giving other constituents voting rights but then
making a series of largely conclusory arguments against it).
82. Strine, supra note 64.
83. Id. at 424–32.
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enforcement rights). 84 He favors mandatory ESG reporting. 85 He believes
that corporations should have compensation committees determine pay
levels for all employees 86 and develop workforce committees to give
workers the voice they lack in nonunionized workplaces. 87 He’d like to see
restrictions on corporate political spending. 88 And he believes external
regulatory regimes—such as those protecting workers, consumers, and the
environment—should be strengthened and restored to their former glory. 89
The most promising corporate governance reforms “do not involve a
revolution, but a restoration.” 90
When it comes to extending real governance rights to other
stakeholders, however, Strine is more cautious. Take codetermination.
While he’s open to the idea, he believes that it is not as politically feasible
as his restorative legislative agenda. 91 He also thinks that codetermination is
unlikely to succeed without first building up the repositories of worker power
that already exist in countries with significant codetermination regimes, such
as strong unions, works councils, and an underlying infrastructure of worker
representation. 92 And he’s worried that many of the details of
codetermination haven’t been worked out—such as who, exactly, gets to
vote for worker representatives; who may serve as such a representative, and
how much they are paid; how frequently the elections are held, and who pays
84. See id. at 424, (“[O]ne of the most central proposals for reforming corporate law, the
public benefit corporation model, builds on and strengthens traditional corporate law, rather
than turning it upside down.”); id. at 424 n.91 (“[T]here is now debate around how effective
the PBC model is in promoting a stakeholder governance approach . . . . [W]e will have more
evidence in coming years.”); see also Jill E. Fisch & Stephen Davidoff Solomon, The “Value”
of a Public Benefit Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND
PERSONHOOD 68, 76 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson, eds., 2021) (“Stakeholders
lack any enforcement rights, even if a PBC explicitly identifies its mission as pursuing the
interests of those stakeholders.”).
85. Strine, supra note 64, at 432; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi O.
Williams, Lifting Labor’s Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power
Within American Corporate Governance 53–54 (Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Colum. Univ. Sch.
of L., Working Paper No. 643, 2021).
86. Strine et al., supra note 85, at 54–56.
87. Id. at 56–58.
88. Strine, supra note 64, at 429–31; Kovvali & Strine, supra note 50, at 3–5, 25–32; see
also Lund & Strine, supra note 51 (discussing the risks of corporate political spending).
89. See Strine et al., supra note 85, at 58–61 (“Putting worker directors on boards cannot
be expected to help American workers unless the promise of equity toward workers
exemplified by the New Deal is restores.”); Strine, supra note 64, at 433 (“[R]evitalized
external regulation is essential to restoring a fair American economy.”).
90. Strine, supra note 64, at 397.
91. Strine et al., supra note 85.
92. See Strine, supra note 64, at 434 (discussing the political conditions that need to
change before codetermination can function appropriately).
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for them; and the like. 93 Better to start with more modest reforms before
moving on to consider codetermination. 94
While we are cheered by Strine’s desire to move toward
codetermination, we don’t find the arguments in favor of delaying that move
to be altogether convincing. First, the restoration of New Deal types of
worker protections (to say nothing of later consumer and environmental
protections) involves a tremendous number of moving parts. It would
require quite a bit of legislative momentum to shore up protections for all
other corporate constituents, especially in the face of continued corporate
political spending on behalf of shareholders. Though more radical, it may
be easier, in a single legislative moment, to restructure large corporations
from the inside out.
Second, though it’s been claimed elsewhere as well, 95 we know of no
evidence that the success of codetermination depends on the presence of
other repositories of worker power. The mere fact that the two coexist in
some of the European countries does not prove the point. Maybe the ongoing
viability of top-down, codetermined corporate boards depends upon the
presence of bottom-up, worker protections. Maybe it’s the other way
around. 96 In truth, strong worker protections within and without the
corporation are probably mutually reinforcing, and it seems best to use a beltand-suspenders approach. In any case, the argument that we should not
move forward with codetermination because workers lack political and
economic power is self-defeating, to say the least. 97
When it comes to the more practical concerns, our country could (and
most likely would) phase in any system of codetermination. We could, for
93. Strine et al., supra note 85, at 34–50.
94. Strine et al., supra note 85, at 50–63 (“[A]dvocates of codetermination must create a
foundation on which a reasonably effective system of minimalist codetermination can stand,
and that creates the genuine potential for moving from minimalism to a more complete,
ground-up system . . . .”).
95. See, e.g., Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmüller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S.
Corporations, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 870, 877 (2020) (discussing the institutional, legal,
and economic differences that supposedly make codetermination more suitable in Germany
than the United States).
96. Take, for example, a key part of that underlying apparatus in Germany—the shoplevel works councils. Such entities are currently prohibited by § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act in the United States, and for good reason. We worry that such committees may
be used by firms to fend off real unions or, more broadly, give their workers a false sense that
they have a real voice in company affairs. A codetermined corporate board, however,
alleviates that worry, and paves the way for shop-level worker committees.
97. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Codetermination in Theory and Practice,
73 FLA. L. REV. 321, 347 (2021) (“The relative powerlessness of workers . . . becomes reason
to retain the feature of the governance structure that disempowers them to begin with.”).
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example, start with corporations of a certain size before extending it to
smaller firms. We could give corporations tax incentives to move toward
codetermined governance. And we could ramp up the required percentage
of worker representatives on the boards over time. These kinds of measures
would allow for the development of the supporting infrastructure for worker
representation and permit us to make the kinds of tweaks and course
corrections that would be demanded by such a significant change.
And all this leads us to a broader point. One thing missing from the
agenda of most advocates of stakeholder theory, and from discussions of
corporate purpose more generally, is the real prospect of assigning
governance rights to stakeholders. This is somewhat understandable. For a
long time, stakeholder advocates didn’t really have much of a model for
allocating rights and responsibilities among corporate participants. 98 But, at
this point, such models exist, including ours that points towards extending
governance rights to workers in typical situations but is flexible enough to
accommodate other stakeholders in more unusual situations. 99 There’s also
been increasing awareness among American corporate law scholars of the
continuing vitality of codetermination in many European countries. 100
We think that the corporate purpose debates make little sense unless
they involve giving some stakeholders—in particular, workers—full
governance rights in corporations. One reason for this is that stakeholder
interests need to be defined by the stakeholders themselves. The recent
debates over corporate purpose have centered on whether shareholderelected boards should take account of the interests of other stakeholders, not
how those interests are defined. It’s largely assumed that boards and
corporate officers will be able to discern what’s in the best interests of
various stakeholders. But there’s little reason to think this is true, which
raises the question—what’s the best way to capture the preferences of these
other corporate constituents?
For many corporate stakeholders, the answer might be that their
interests are best handled through regulation (such as environmental
stakeholders) or contract (such as consumers). That is, those stakeholders
may express their preferences through the political system or through
contracting (or refusing to contract with) the corporation. Others, such as
98. See HAYDEN & BODIE, supra note 43, at 158–60.
99. See id. at 145–71.
100. See, e.g., Dammann & Eidenmüller, supra note 95 (discussing why codetermination
has succeeded in Germany); Strine et al., supra note 85 (comparing the United States to other
nations with board codetermination); Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The
History of German Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135 (2016) (explaining
how German codetermination arose).
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workers, should be able to express their interests more directly, through their
elected representatives on the board. The Accountable Capitalism Act,101
proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren, would require that companies with
more than $1 billion in gross receipts have employees select at least 40% of
the seats on the board. 102 Senator Tammy Baldwin has proposed the Reward
Work Act, 103 which proposes that one-third of directors be selected directly
by employees. 104 These proposals build on the work of progressive corporate
law scholars who have advocated for more direct employee involvement in
corporate governance. 105
From the point of view of law and economics, which generally eschews
the kind of paternalism that comes with telling people what they should want,
there should be nobody better to express the true preferences of workers than
the workers themselves. Having shareholder-elected board members, or the
officers they hire, make decisions about what they think is best for workers
is always going to be an approximation. Board members might guess, for
example, that workers are primarily interested in higher wages. In fact, we
know from several recent studies that employees at codetermined firms in
Germany effectively trade away wages in return for better job security. A
study by E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug, and Christoph Scheider, for example,
confirmed that employees at full-parity codetermined firms are better
protected against layoffs during industry downturns, 106 but pay a premium
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).
Id. § 6(b)(1).
Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018).
Id. § 3(b).
See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16 (1995) (arguing that boards of directors
should take into account the effects of their decisions on all of the corporation’s stakeholders,
including employees); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 283, 287 (1998) (“[W]orkers should have some kind of representation on the board of
directors or have some role in electing directors, and . . . directors of companies should be
held to have some kind of fiduciary duties to workers in the employ of their firm.”); Robert
Hockett, Why (Only) ESOPs?, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 84, 85 (2006) (arguing for a broader
approach to the “ownership society” through employee ownership); Brett H. McDonnell,
Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429
(2011) (discussing possible strategies for creating a role for employees in corporate
governance); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008) (arguing for the preeminence
of employees in corporate governance).
106. E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug & Christoph Scheider, Labor Representation in Governance
as an Insurance Mechanism, 2018 REV. FIN. 1251, 1286. In another study, Jäger, Schofer,
and Heining concluded that “worker representation on boards does not appear to affect wage
setting, as measured by average wages, firms’ wage policies, the wage structure within firms,
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equal to 3.3% of their wages for this employment insurance. 107 Importantly,
this swap of wages for job security has no effect on shareholders one way or
the other. 108 And this, too, is a generalization; workers may well value
different things in different industries and under different economic
conditions. But there’s certainly no reason to think shareholder-elected
boards have better insight into the preferences of their workers than the
workers themselves.
Ultimately, stakeholderism without governance rights offers illusory,
meaningless protection. So long as a corporate board is accountable to
shareholders alone, they will ultimately cater to shareholder interests. The
Business Roundtable letter from CEO’s pledging to pursue the interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders has, thus far, been an empty promise. 109
And without any legal accountability, it’s difficult to see how it could be
otherwise. Even public benefit corporations, which constitute the core of
Strine’s prescription for recovery from shareholder primacy, lack a real
enforcement mechanism. Shareholders still define the interests of other
stakeholders and shareholders still call the shots.
CONCLUSION
We fully agree with Strine’s call for “a forthright agenda that
emphasizes the shared interests of working people of all colors, as well as
connects the decline in gainsharing between workers and the corporations
for whom they toil with the decline in unions and overall employee voice.” 110
We may differ a bit on the relative weights of various proposals, and the
appropriate timeline to follow. But the need for structural change in
or the degree of rent sharing.” Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer & Jörg Heining, Labor in the
Boardroom, 136 Q.J. ECON. 669, 720 (2021). This suggests, then, that this feature of
employment insurance at codetermined firms was not a result of employee entrenchment in
the form of employee-manager collusion, and it did not come at the expense of other corporate
constituents.
107. Kim et al., supra note 106, at 1279, 1286. The benefit of this employment insurance
was really only experienced by white collar and skilled blue collar employees; unskilled blue
collar workers do not receive much in the way of job security protections. Id. at 1286. The
authors of the study attribute this finding to the lack of real representation of unskilled workers
on supervisory boards. Id.
108. Kim et al., supra note 106, at 1286.
109. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, Stakeholder Capitalism in the
Time of COVID, 40 YALE J. REGUL. (forthcoming 2023), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
4026803; James Mackintosh, Shareholders Reign Supreme Despite CEO Promises to Society,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2022, 7:40 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shareholders-reignsupreme-despite-ceo-promises-to-society-11644496644 [https://perma.cc/V6PP-3MUW].
110. Strine, supra note 62, at 69.

2022]

POWER, PRIMACY, AND THE CORPORATE LAW PIVOT

907

governance is overwhelmingly clear. The corporate law academy and the
corporate governance community must recognize the failure of the status quo
and pivot to a new perspective. We are fortunate that our friend from
Delaware is well-positioned to lead us in this new direction.

